4
Treaties, a large portion of the frontier was still undelimited. Another Commission would mean further delay. Besides, the boundary which he suggested was the only natural one possible.
Na-t'ung said that this was not a matter which the Wai-wu Pu could decide. It must be left to local arrangement.
Sir Ernest inquired why the Chinese Government could not settle the question. It could not be left again to the Yunnan authorities to decide. For five years they had done nothing but obstruct a settlement.
Na-t'ung said that they could order the Viceroy to appoint a competent official to proceed at once to the spot and settle the question with the British Delegates, but they could not agree to-day to accept the watershed as the boundary.
Sir Ernest said that to leave the question to the Yunnan Viceroy to decide would mean that he would come back with the old story about the native Chiefs and their patents, and that the real boundary was the 'maikha River, &c. He might tell his Excellency as a friend that the Indian Government would not accept these excuses.
Na-t'ung maintained that they could demonstrate that the native Chiefs had patents from China.
Sir Ernest said that they had occupied five years in saying so, but had never demonstrated the fact. Where were their proofs?
Ku Chao Hsin explained that they had been shown to British officers who had visited the district.
Sir Ernest denied that this was true. When and to whom had they been shown?
Na-t'ung said that the Yunnan authorities would not have made the assertion without there being some foundation for it. If they could produce no proofs that the Chiefs had such patents, then they would not oppose the proposal that the watershed should be the boundary.
Sir Ernest observed that His Excellency had remarked, with reference to the Pailai (Hpare) and Meng Tum incidents, that bygones should be bygones, but, if he wished him to say nothing more about these incidents, then he, too, should drop his Chiefs and their musty parchments. It was impossible to excuse them for deliberately opposing a peaceful expedition, though notified of its nature, and warned that, if they sent troops, there would be danger of a collision.
Na-t'ung repeated that the difficulty was these native Chiefs, whom China could not abandon. They had shown their patents to the British military officers. He knew of no better plan than to appoint Delegates to settle the question on the spot. (His Excellency here handed a Memorandum giving the date--May 1900--on which the patents were shown and the names, in Chinese, of the British officers present. The occasion referred to is reported in the despatch of the 18th June, 1900, from the Government of Burmah to the Government of India.)
Sir Ernest remarked that another Boundary Commission might take five years again to determine the boundary. In the meanwhile, if the Indian Government considered the watershed, and China the N'maikha River, as the boundary, and troops were sent by both sides, they would certainly come into collision.
Na-t'ung said it might be agreed that neither party should send troops.
Sir Ernest regretted that he could not enter into an agreement undertaking that the Indian Government should not send troops. The hostile action of China which resulted in the Pailai (Hpare) incident rendered such an agreement impossible. If China, however, would undertake not to send troops across the watershed, he would be willing to ask the Indian Government to appoint a fresh Commission to delimit the boundary on the understanding, of course, that China should also send officers to the spot for the purpose, including amongst them a Representative from Peking of the Foreign Board. The Indian Government, he believed, had no wish to send troops, but, if China did so, they would do so, and they would not give an undertaking in any case not to send troops. If China, however, gave such an undertaking, the probabilities were that India would not send troops.
Na-t'ung maintained that the agreement should be mutual. With regard to the delay of which Sir Ernest complained, the present Viceroy of Yunnan was a capable officer who would settle matters promptly. The collision had occurred when things in China were generally unsettled.
Sir Ernest replied that, unless China agreed to refrain from sending troops, it was no use negotiating. His instructions were that His Majesty's Government intended to regard the watershed as the boundary, and that, should this frontier not be respected and armed parties be sent across it, there would be a risk of their coming into collision with British forces.
Na-t'ung asked if this was a provisional arrangement.
Sir Ernest said that he could only repeat his instructions. Na-t'ung inquired whether the Treaty did not provide that there should be a settlement and delimitation of this portion of the frontier.
Sir Ernest said that it did do so. There was to be a settlement first and a delimitation to follow, as in 1897. He did not wish to be forced to deliver a message that would be disagreeable for the Chinese Government to receive, and he hoped that an arrangement would be possible. If his Excellency would send him a note saying that, until the frontier was being delimited, China would not send troops across the watershed, he would ask that officers be sent from India as soon as possible to demarcate the boundary.
Na-t'ung inquired whether he was correct in having understood Sir Ernest to say that the Indian Government, although unwilling to give an undertaking to the effect, had no intention to send troops to the district under discussion.
Sir Ernest repeated what he had said before on the subject, adding that he could not use the words "provisional frontier" in speaking of the watershed, which was a line which the Chinese must not cross.
Na-t'ung objected to the last point, saying that not to use the term "provisional frontier" would imply that China acquiesced to the watershed as a permanent frontier. He thanked Sir Ernest for having discussed the question in so friendly a manner with him. He would report their conversation to Prince Ch'ing, and either write or see him again in a few days.
Peking, December 1, 1903.
5
0
89
4
Treaties, a large portion of the frontier was still undelimited. Another Commission would mean further delay. Besides, the boundary which he suggested was the only natural one possible.
Na-t'ung said that this was not a matter which the Wai-wu Pu could decide. must be left to local arrangement.
It
Sir Ernest inquired why the Chinese Government could not settle the question. It could not be left again to the Yunnan authorities to decide. For five years they had done nothing but obstruct a settlement.
Na-tang said that they could order the Viceroy to appoint a competent official to proceed at once to the spot and settle the question with the British Delegates, but they could not agree to-day to accept the watershed as the boundary.
Sir Ernest said that to leave the question to the Yunnan Viceroy to decide would mean that he would come back with the old story about the native Chiefs and their patents, and that the real boundary was the 'maikha River, &c. He might tell his Excellency as a friend that the Indian Government would not accept these
excuses.
Na-t'ung maintained that they could demonstrate that the native Chiefs had patents from China.
Sir Ernest said that they had occupied five years in saying so, but had never demonstrated the fact. Where were their proofs ?
Ku Chao Hsin explained that they had been shown to British officers who had visited the district.
Sir Ernest denied that this was true. shown ?
When and to whom had they been
Na-t'ung said that the Yunnan authorities would not have made the assertion without there being some foundation for it. If they could produce no proofs that the Chiefs had such patents, then they would not oppose the proposal that the watershed should be the boundary.
Sir Ernest observed that His Excellency had remarked, with reference to the Pailai (Ipare) and Meng Tum incidents, that bygones should be bygones, but, if he wished him to say nothing more about these incidents, then he, too, should drop his Chiefs and their musty parchments. It was impossible to excuse them for deliberately opposing a peaceful expedition, though notified of its nature, and warned that, if they sent troops, there would he danger of a collision.
Na-t'ung repeated that the difficulty was these native Chiefs, whom China could not abandon. They had shown their patents to the British military officers. He knew of no better plan than to appoint Delegates to settle the question on the spot. (His Excellency here handed a Memorandum giving the date-- May 1900-on which the patents were shown and the names, in Chinese, of the British officers present. The occasion referred to is reported in the despatch of the 18th June, 1900, from the Government of Burmah to the Government of India.)
Sir Ernest remarked that another Boundary Commission might take five years again to determine the boundary. In the meanwhile, if the Indian Government considered the watershed, and China the N'maikha River, as the boundary, and troops were sent by both sides, they would certainly come into collision,
Na-t'ung said it might be agreed that neither party should send troops.
Sir Ernest regretted that he could not enter into an agreement undertaking that the Indian Government should not send troops. The hostile action of China which resulted in the Pailai (Hpare) incident rendered such an agreement impossible. If China, how- ever, would undertake not to send troops across the watershed, he would be willing to ask the Indian Government to appoint a fresh Commission to delimit the boundary on the understanding, of course, that China should also send officers to the spot for the purpose, including amongst them a Representative from Peking of the Foreign Board. The Indian Government, he believed, had no wish to send troops, but, if China did so, they would do So, and they would not give an undertaking in any case not to send troops. If China, however, gave such an undertaking, the probabilities were that India would not send troops.
Na-t'ung maintained that the agreement should be mutual. With regard to the delay of which Sir Ernest complained, the present Viceroy of Yunnan was a capable officer who would settle matters promptly. The collision had occurred when things in China were generally unsettled.
Sir Ernest replied that, unless China agreed to refrain from sending troops, it was no use negotiating. His instructions were that His Majesty's Government intended to regard the watershed as the boundary, and that, should this frontier not be respected and
5
armed parties be sent across it, there would be a risk of their coming into collision with British forces.
Na-t'ung asked if this was a provisional arrangement.
Sir Ernest said that he could only repeat his instructions. Na-tung inquired whether the Treaty did not provide that there should be a settle- ment and delimitation of this portion of the frontier.
Sir Ernest said that it did do so. There was to be a settlement first and a delimitation to follow, as in 1897. He did not wish to be forced to deliver a message that would be disagreeable for the Chinese Government to receive, and he hoped that an arrangement would be possible. If his Excellency would send him a note saying that, until the frontier was being delimited, China would not send troops across the watershed, he would ask that officers be sent from India as soon as possible to demarcate the boundary.
Na-t'ung inquired whether he was correct in having understood Sir Ernest to say that the Indian Government, although unwilling to give an undertaking to the effect, had no intention to send troops to the district under discussion.
Sir Ernest repeated what he had said before on the subject, adding that he could not use the words "provisional frontier" in speaking of the watershed, which was a line which the Chinese must not cross.
Na-t'ung objected to the last point, saying that not to use the term "provisional frontier" would imply that China acquiesced to the watershed as a permanent frontier. He thanked Sir Ernest for having discussed the question in so friendly a manner with him. He would report their conversation to Prince Ch'ing, and either write or see bim again in a few days.
Peking, December 1, 1903.
0
89
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.